


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13 April 1963

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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN



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
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13 April 1963

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
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2. USSR: Change of May Day slogan reflects continued differences in top leadership. (Page 3)

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
4. Congo: Announcement of intention to release Gizenga is aimed at relieving parliamentary pressure on government. (Page 5)

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8. Notes: Peru;



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USSR: The extraordinary alteration in the May Day slogan concerning Yugoslavia suggests the continuation of considerable differences within the top Soviet leadership.

The change, which moves Yugoslavia into the category of a country "building socialism," bears upon a fundamental issue in the Soviet Union's dispute with China. As recently as 30 March, in its letter to the Chinese, Moscow reaffirmed that it considered Yugoslavia a "socialist" country. On 3 April, Khrushchev met with Yugoslav leader Vukmanovic-Tempo and told him that the Soviet position was firm on Yugoslavia's being a socialist state and would not be changed.

Omission of the reference to "building socialism" in the slogan as first published on 8 April suggests, therefore, that a difference of opinion on this question arose which resulted in the use of the same formula concerning Yugoslavia that has been in use since 1958. It is also possible, however, that the original slogan was published at the instigation of leaders who saw in Khrushchev's absence on vacation an opportunity to indicate their disagreement with some of his policies.

The alteration of the slogan is unprecedented and reflects the importance which Khrushchev attaches to this particular issue. The delay in making the change from 8 to 11 April, however, suggests that Khrushchev may have had difficulty in reasserting his position. The correction will drive home the intention of Khrushchev and his followers in the leadership to insist on their fundamental doctrinal position in their bilateral talks with the Chinese.

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DAILY BRIEF

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*Congo: [Adoula's announcement that he intends to release Antoine Gizenga, the leftist former Stanleyville leader, is aimed at relieving parliamentary pressures on the government.]

[The premier told US Embassy officials on 10 April the opposition would reunite on the issue of Gizenga's continued detention and overthrow the government. He said he was having real difficulties in reshuffling his government and indicated he was trying to buy time until parliament could be recessed about 24 April.]

[Gizenga's strength lies in what he can draw from his self-appointed role as the "heir" to the late Patrice Lumumba, and not from any personal brilliance, leadership ability, or popular following. Although in the free-for-all of Congo politics his image may tarnish, he could serve as a rallying point and front man for extremist elements.]

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NOTES

Peru: Rumors are increasing that the armed forces officer corps may soon force further changes in the membership of the ruling military junta in order to obtain the indefinite suspension of the elections scheduled for next June. The military, strongly opposed as always to Haya de la Torre's APRA party, are apparently apprehensive that the present junta will fail to prevent an APRA victory in the elections. Leaders of APRA have threatened that the party would "fight" if the military interfered in the elections.

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DAILY BRIEF

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THE PRESIDENT
The Vice President
Executive Offices of the White House
 Special Counsel to the President
 The Special Assistant for National Security Affairs
 The Scientific Adviser to the President
 The Director of the Budget
 The Director, National Aeronautics and Space Administration
The Department of State
 The Secretary of State
 The Under Secretary of State
 The Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs
 The Deputy Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs
 The Counselor and Chairman of the Policy Planning Council
 The Director of Intelligence and Research
The Treasury Department
 The Secretary of the Treasury
 The Under Secretary of the Treasury
The Department of Defense
 The Secretary of Defense
 The Deputy Secretary of Defense
 The Secretary of the Army
 The Secretary of the Navy
 The Secretary of the Air Force
 The Assistant Secretary of Defense (International Security Affairs)
 The Assistant Secretary of Defense
 The Chairman, The Joint Chiefs of Staff
 Chief of Naval Operations, United States Navy
 Chief of Staff, United States Air Force
 Chief of Staff, United States Army
 Commandant, United States Marine Corps
 U.S. Rep., Military Committee and Standing Group, NATO
 Supreme Allied Commander, Europe
 Commander in Chief, Pacific
 Commander in Chief, Atlantic
 The Director, Defense Intelligence Agency
 The Director, The Joint Staff
 The Director for Intelligence, The Joint Staff
 The Assistant Chief of Staff for Intelligence, Department of Army
 The Director of Naval Intelligence, Department of Navy
 The Assistant Chief of Staff, Intelligence, Department of the Air Force
The Department of Justice
 The Attorney General
 The Federal Bureau of Investigation
 The Director
The Atomic Energy Commission
 The Chairman
The National Security Agency
 The Director
The United States Information Agency
 The Director
The National Indications Center
 The Director

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